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Spinoza’s Conatus Undoes 
Bourdieu’s Habitus
Abstract
Bourdieu’s intermittent allusions to Spinoza’s conatus disclose the weaknesses of his 
concept of habitus. A thorough inspection of his involvement with the Spinozist legacy 
reveals a long-lasting inconsistency, for he expects that conatus will assist him in both 1) 
grounding the habitus and solving the uncertainties that surround this notion by endorsing 
a strong conatus, impervious to the resistances it will eventually encounter; and 2) re-
instating agency in the structuralist mindset, a program retrospectively admitted by 
Bourdieu in 1987 and bound to a weak conatus, exposed to the interfering resistance of 
exterior forces and thus determined by the interaction with contingent events. Bourdieu 
noticed this incongruity around 1993. At that time, he renounced to buttressing the 
habitus by means of the dynamizing character of conatus. So began the later evolution 
of his thought, linked to the antithetical demand of both a weak and a strong conatus, a 
request commanded in its turn by an overarching habitus. One outcome of this conflict 
is that agency can hardly be summoned if Bourdieu’s conception of a “strong” conatus 
prevails and the dispositions making up the habitus are irreversible. In contrast, both 
Bourdieu’s appeal to controlled improvisation, and the ensuing concept of strategy, 
demand a “weak” conatus. Overall, the notion of habitus has been dubbed “a Trojan 
Horse for determinism” and endorses in fact what might be called the “mythology of 
permanence,” that is, the historically long-held belief in an all-embracing everlastingness. 
Bourdieu’s use of Spinoza’s conatus, in sum, besides highlighting the immutable social 
reproduction entailed by the habitus, acts as a litmus test for the ambiguities and 
shortcomings of this notion.
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I. Conatus raises opposite expectations
Bourdieu’s recurrent references to Spinoza’s conatus reveal the fragility of his concept of habitus. As will be shown, Bourdieu’s use of conatus not only acts as a sort of litmus test for the uncertainties and failings of the 
habitus but primarily brings to light that this concept entails immutable social 
reproduction and so reinforces the charge of being a kind of “Trojan Horse” for 
determinism. In fact, the support that Bourdieu expected from conatus backfired 
because he applied this notion in conflicting ways, which gave an unsettling blow 
to the already staggering habitus.
As will be discussed in detail below, Bourdieu summons the Spinozist legacy 
in opposite ways. In his scattered uses of Spinoza’s conatus, two contradictory 
demands may be discerned. He expects that conatus may assist him in:
1) Grounding the habitus, i.e. solving the uncertainties that surround this notion. 
Does the habitus really exist? Is not this concept a groundless hypostatization? 
Is its alleged permanence warranted? These ambiguities bid endorsing a strong 
conatus, i.e. a sort of “engine of the habitus” endowed with un-revisable strength 
and impervious to the resistances it will eventually encounter. Bourdieu’s mis-
reading of Spinoza pushes its roots in the rigidity imposed by a well-grounded 
habitus. 
2) Re-instating agency in the structuralist mindset, a program retrospectively ac-
knowledged by Bourdieu in 1987. This desired re-establishment demands a weak 
conatus, i.e. a revisable conatus exposed to the interfering resistance of exterior 
forces, and thus congruent, in this respect, with Spinoza’s doctrine. The predicate 
“weak” alludes to a mode of existence altogether oriented upon itself, albeit 
devoid of self-consciousness and uncommitted to clear-cut aims. Primarily, it be-
comes determined by interactions of contingent events (hence its “weakness”).
Bourdieu noticed this inconsistency around 1993. He saw that an alleged “dy-
namizing character” of conatus (Bourdieu endorsed this view from 1984 to 
1993) does not assist in neither grounding the habitus nor re-instating agency. 
In his later thought he tried to solve this twofold quandary by subordinating co-
natus to habitus, while retaining the muted antagonism between a weak and a 
strong version of conatus. A scrutiny of the Spinozian background of conatus (the 
staple reference for Bourdieu) appears indispensable for revealing the full impact 
of this incongruity.
II. Conatus and the social sciences
According to Spinoza, as is well known, substance (Spinoza’s immanent God, 
the natura naturans) is infinitely productive, has generated everything, and ex-
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presses itself through the finite modi, all of them impelled by the affirmative 
force of the conatus. More precisely, Spinoza derives the notion of conatus 
from his metaphysical thought concerning finite things and their relation to 
the infinite substance, God: each finite thing is a determinate expression of 
the essence of God, hence an expression of God’s power. Nothing can be 
destroyed except by an external cause. This fundamental principle applies to 
all finite modes.
“Conatus,” therefore, indicates a general tendency towards self-preser-
vation. Each thing, be it conceived under either thought or extension, “en-
deavours to persist in its own being” and has an “active power” to stay in 
that way. This conatus remains constant unless actively interfered with (this 
is what the Bourdieuan occasional endorsement of a “strong” conatus tends 
to forget).
While the fundamental thesis of the conatus doctrine is that “each thing, 
insofar as it is in itself (quantum in se est), endeavours (conatur) to persevere 
in its being,”1 when Spinoza speaks of a thing as far as it is in itself, howev-
er, he appears to mean “insofar as it is unaffected by anything else.” It is 
worthwhile to remark that in the same Eth. III6 he states that nothing has “in 
itself” anything by which it can be destroyed (“While we attend only to the 
thing itself, and not to external causes, we can find nothing in it which could 
destroy it.”2). In the next proposition, Spinoza understands this “endeavour”3 
(conatus) as a “power” (potentia), displayed by “each thing, in so far as it can 
by its own power [de potentia].” This is “the power, or endeavour, by which 
[each thing] endeavours to persevere in its being.”4
In short: according to Spinoza, things (modes) affect each other while 
each strives to maintain its own being. Thus, what a thing actually does is 
not the outcome of its endeavour or power alone. It results, on the contrary, 
from the interaction between its endeavour or power and the endeavours or 
powers of the other things that affect it. The conatus of any entity can only 
be destroyed by an exterior force. “Everything essentially opposes (opponi-
tur) anything that can threaten its existence.”5 Stuart Hampshire furnished a 
clear rendering of this circumstance:
1 Eth. III6. References to Spinoza’s Ethics: Capital Roman numerals designate Books I-V. Cf. 
Edwin Curley, ed., The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. 1 (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1985).
2 Eth. III4.
3 This should not be understood, of course, in reference to the “endeavour” of someone who 
has conscious aims or objectives, because according to Spinoza the body as well as the mind 
can be said to “endeavour.” “Will” is only a type of conatus. Cf. Eth. III9.
4 Eth. III7.
5 Eth. III6.
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The identity of any particular thing in nature logically depends 
on its power of self-maintenance [...]. This tendency, in spite of 
external causes, makes it the particular thing that it is [...]. The 
greater the power of self-maintenance of the particular thing in 
the face of external causes, the greater reality it has, and the 
more clearly it can be distinguished as having a definite nature 
and individuality.6
It should come as no surprise, therefore, the assiduous involvement of the 
social and political sciences with the idea of conatus. “While the philosoph-
ical reading of Spinoza sets out by the concepts of causa sui and substance, 
the sociological reading begins with the concept of conatus.”7 Small won-
der, because intuitively the conatus undergirds the life trajectory of any hu-
man being as set against the backdrop of successive social contexts. This 
pre-eminence has been repeatedly highlighted: “The concept of conatus, i.e. 
the tendency of everything to persevere in its being, is the Spinozist concept 
chiefly favoured by the social sciences.”8 This positive reception, however, 
must be profiled against the ideological pressures of our age, which have 
tended to view the Spinozist conatus as the “figurehead (figure tutélaire), in 
former times occupied by Marx, of a critical-materialist philosophy.”9 It has 
happened, in short, that, 
Spinozism has mesmerized present-day political thought not 
only through its ages-old aura of materialism and radical athe-
ism but also by its socio-political mindset, which privileges force 
and struggle for power and denounces the contractualist fet-
ichism adopted by the bourgeois political standpoint.10
III. Grounding the habitus
Bourdieu repeatedly saw the necessity of grounding the habitus, which meant 
above all justifying its existence, countering its shortcomings, and offsetting 
6 Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1951), 122.
7 Frédéric Lordon, “Conatus et institutions: Pour un structuralisme énergétique,” L’Année de la 
régulation 7 (2003): 118.
8 Yves Citton, and Frédéric Lordon, Spinoza et les sciences sociales (Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 
2008), 18.
9 Antoine Lilti, “Rabelais est-il notre contemporain? Histoire intellectuelle et herméneutique 
critique,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 59, no. 4 (2012): 80.
10 Citton, and Lordon, 15.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 31/12/2021 12:08:23 |
[ 135 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 6, ISSUE 2 • 2021
its fragility. But he deployed this concept in manifold ways, which jeopardizes 
the search for an ultimate formula. Habitus exists in many forms, has a wide 
range of uses, and operates in several levels. In the words of Karl Maton,
Habitus is one of the most misunderstood, misused and hotly 
contested of Bourdieu’s ideas. It can be both revelatory and mys-
tifying, instantly recognizable and difficult to define, straight-
forward and slippery. In short, despite its popularity, ‘habitus’ 
remains anything but clear.11
The habitus must be defended against current indictments. Chiefly among 
them are the charge of being a baseless construction or reification and its 
alleged inability to explain social change (its covert imposition of deter-
minism is a quandary discussed below). In fact, the habitus is a conserva-
tive notion, hardly amenable to any sort of learning process and resistant 
to development and change. The baffling disparity between the generative 
experiences of any habitus and the resulting dispositions has also been re-
marked. These dispositions are simply tendencies to act in a particular way, 
yet if closely observed entail several riddles. How are they formed? Do 
they need to become indefinitely actualized, or they get extinct by lack of 
effective realization? Can they disappear under the pressure of a systematic 
counter-socialization?
Small wonder if, as will be discussed in detail below, Bourdieu’s ref-
erences to Spinoza’s conatus are intertwined with his repeated efforts to 
specify the concept of habitus. Brought to its simplest features, habitus is 
the system of socially constituted dispositions that guides agents in their 
perception and action. In Bourdieu’s words, habitus is the “past that sur-
vives in the present, [...] laid down in each agent by his [sic] earliest up-
bringing.” This temporal dimension of the habitus is best highlighted by its 
socio-somatic aspect, which amounts to a long-lasting encounter between 
a knowing body and a repressed but unconsciously enacted history. This 
time-boundedness means, among other things, that
the habitus acquired in the family underlies the structuring of 
school experiences, [so that] the habitus transformed by school-
ing, itself diversified, in turn underlies the structuring of all sub-
sequent experiences.12
11 Karl Maton, “Habitus,” in Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, ed. Michael James Grenfell, 48-64 
(Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), 49.
12 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), 82, and 8 [originally published as Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique 
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Bourdieu stresses the taken-for-granted ways of perceiving, thinking, and 
acting on the part of social actors immersed in their everyday habits.13 This 
explains Bourdieu’s long-held fascination with Spinoza’s conatus, albe-
it distorted by his “strong” misreading of the philosopher. Conatus grants 
propensities to people thanks to the habitus they have acquired. These predis-
positions impel them to act in specific ways and evolve into lifelong personal 
projects, even if they tend to remain unconscious.
Still, an array of fundamental questions remains unsolved14. How can a 
single habitus account for a vast number of practices and discourses? How 
does the sedimentation of past experiences mutate into an array of propen-
sions and dispositions? Granting the temporality of the habitus (it is neither 
wholly structural nor entirely subjective), how does it activate the passivity of 
simple habits, dynamizing their pastness and converting them into actuality? 
In a wider scope, how can extra-corporal reality become embodied? How can 
an array of socializing experiences cohabit in the same body? How can they 
stay there long, and how are they mobilized at the opportune moments of a 
social trajectory? In conclusion, is habitus “often little more than theoretical 
icing on an empirical cake” so that “the concept can be removed without any 
loss of explanatory power?”15 
These difficulties increase if we consider the structure of the habitus. It 
consists in both the hexis (i.e. the unconsciously interiorized ways to relate 
to and to use our body, such as physical demeanour, bodily dispositions and 
linguistic accent) and more diffuse mental habits (principles and values ori-
ented to practice, schemes of perception, classification, feeling and action, 
also unconsciously internalized and far different from simple habits, for they 
allegedly facilitate new solutions to new situations without previous deliber-
ation). As to the hexis dimension of the habitus, it is worthwhile to recall the 
origins of this notion. Already Aristotle pointed out that any intention to act 
must be coupled to an “efficient cause” whose staying power greatly surpass-
es that of the habit, seen as a mere array of basic motor acts. The hexis ap-
(Geneva: Droz, 1972)].
13 It is worthwhile to stress that habit and conatus reinforce each other. Any habit tends to 
persist, and conversely anything that persists is somehow habitual. Habit is the inevitable con-
sequence of conatus, and conatus is what habits necessarily possess.
14 The ahistoricism and limitless validity of the habitus come into view by comparison with 
the Bourdieuan concept of “field,” which possesses only “regional” validity. These “fields,” 
as Bernard Lahire puts it, “are nowhere to be found in the Guayaki society described by Pierre 
Clastres or in Claude Lévi-Strauss’ Nambikwara.” Cf. Felice Dassetto, and Bernard Lahire, 
“À propos de l’ouvrage de Bernard Lahire, Dans les plis singuliers du social,” Recherches 
Sociologiques 44, no. 2 (2013): 161.
15 Maton, 63.
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peared thus as an acquired, active, and persistent condition, a sort of hoarded 
knowledge which stays permanently committed and never becomes passive. 
Bourdieu inherited these Aristotelian views, and in his later work the hexis be-
came crucial for understanding the disposition to act, for it designates both 
the (socially conditioned) physical body, its gestures and attitudes, and above 
all its constituting efficacy.
Regrettably, these quandaries have been often misunderstood by com-
mentators: “Bourdieu’s sociology allows a detailed approach to the way in 
which conatus works, and conversely its conceptual foundations can be en-
hanced by means of Spinoza’s philosophy [...]. This sociology could indeed 
adopt the conatus as the principle of action it evidently lacks.”16 It has been 
said as well that conatus undergirds habitus in multiple ways. This view, how-
ever, tends to aggravate the congenital blur of habitus:
Bourdieu uses his concept of habitus to generalize through quite 
different domains of human activity. Its originality is to suggest 
that these may be an underlying connection or common imprint 
across a broad sweep of different types of behaviour, including 
motor, cognitive, emotional or moral behaviours. But this very 
appealing conceptual versatility sometimes renders ambiguous 
just what the concept actually designates empirically.17
To overcome these perplexities, it is worthwhile to inspect Bourdieu’s in-
volvement with Spinoza’s conatus. His references are sparse, and their mean-
ing underwent a subtle turnaround over time. A gradual loss of relevance 
can indeed be observed. In the initial uses of the term (roughly from 1984 
to 1993), conatus simply “dynamizes”18 the habitus. Bourdieu’s initially 
far-reaching attitude, however, softens somehow during a brief, intermediate 
period (aprox. from 1993 to 1996), when conatus no longer commands or 
determines habitus and merely “inhabits” (or “is located in”) it. Lastly, in the 
final years from 1994 to 2001, the reversal is complete. Now it is conatus 
that “is fulfilled by” (or emerges “embodied in”) the habitus. In other words, 
conatus appears prevailed upon by habitus in this later time. As a result, it 
seems to possess the “strong” features surmised by Bourdieu, while it merely 
16 Lordon, 124.
17 David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), 109.
18 Steve Fuller carelessly presupposes that Bourdieu’s whole oeuvre endorses this “dynamizing” 
power held by conatus by enabling the social agent to act in particular ways: “conatus pro-
vides habitus with its dynamic character.” Cf. Steve Fuller, “Conatus,” in Pierre Bourdieu: Key 
Concepts, ed. Michael James Grenfell, 171-182 (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), 178. But a closer 
look at Bourdieu’s texts detects a dramatic (and revealing) evolution of his thought.
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replicates the habitus’ imperviousness to change. Even when the individual’s 
conatus is foiled by the ups and downs of human existence, his or her adjust-
ment to the social world does not evolve.
Let us examine in detail this baffling about-turn in Bourdieu’s concern 
with Spinoza’s conatus. In a text from 1984, conatus assists the reproduction 
of social reality. Bourdieu asserts that there is
a multiplicity of simultaneous but independent inventions, albeit 
objectively orchestrated, realized [...] by agents endowed with 
similar systems of dispositions and, so to speak, the same so-
cial conatus (by which we mean that combination of dispositions 
and interests associated with a particular class of social position 
which inclines social agents to strive to reproduce [...] the prop-
erties constituting their social identity)19
Likewise, in a text of 1989 conatus appears as both the internal determina-
tion of the habitus and the ground of its tendency to perpetuate itself: 
Given that habitus is genetically (as well as structurally) linked 
to a position, it always tends to express, through schemata that 
are its embodied form, both the space of the different or op-
posed positions [...] and a practical stance towards this space 
[...]. Its tendency to perpetuate itself according to its internal 
determination, its conatus, by asserting its autonomy in relation 
to the situation [...], is a tendency to perpetuate an identity that 
is difference.20
At that time, thus, habitus seems to be endowed with conatus. A few years 
later (1992) conatus is understood, more precisely, as the specific inertia of 
the habitus (aka. hysteresis):
[In certain situations] conduct remains unintelligible unless you 
bring into the picture habitus and its specific inertia, its hysteresis. 
[In Algeria,] peasants endowed with a precapitalist habitus were 
suddenly uprooted and forcibly thrown into a capitalist cosmos, 
[which] is one illustration [of hysteresis]. [Likewise, in] histori-
19 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), 176 (ita-
lics added) [originally published as Homo Academicus (Paris: Minuit, 1984)].
20 Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, trans. Lauretta C. 
Clough (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 2-3 (italics added) [originally published as 
La Noblesse d’État (Paris: Seuil, 1989)]. 
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cal conjunctures of a revolutionary nature, changes in objective 
structures are so swift that agents whose mental structures have 
been moulded by these prior structures become obsolete and act 
at cross purposes (à contre-temps). [...] In short, social groups 
owe this tendency to persevere in its being mostly to the fact 
that the agents are endowed with durable dispositions, apt to 
survive the social and economic conditions partly created by 
themselves.21
Around 1991, Bourdieu maintains that conatus stirs the action of the people 
holding power:
Power is animated by a kind of conatus, as Spinoza called it, a 
tendency to perpetuate itself, a tendency to persist in its be-
ing [...]. People who hold power or capital act, whether they are 
aware of it or not, in such a way as to perpetuate or increase 
their power and their capital. This conatus, which is the constant 
movement by which the social body is sustained, leads the differ-
ent bodies that hold capital to confront one another [...].22 
Mitigating the approach endorsed thus far, in which conatus prevailed upon 
habitus, around 1993 Bourdieu begins to relax his stance and wavers between 
asserting that conatus “is located in” the habitus and precising that “conatus 
is a striving, inclination, natural tendency, impulse or effort.” This last de-
piction appears in a note to a text on issues related to family and education, 
where Bourdieu explains that
the father is the site and the instrument of the ‘project’ (or better 
yet, of a conatus) inscribed in inherited dispositions and attrib-
utes [...]. To inherit is to relay these immanent dispositions, to 
perpetuate this conatus, and to accept making oneself the docile 
instrument of this ‘project’ of reproduction.23
21 Pierre Bourdieu, and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 130 (italics added) [originally published as Réponses: Pour 
une anthropologie réflexive (Paris: Minuit, 1992)].
22 Pierre Bourdieu, On the State: Lectures at the College de France 1989-1992, eds. Patrick 
Champagne, Remi Lenoir, Franck Poupeau, and Marie-Christine Riviere, trans. David Fernbach 
(Cambridge: Polity 2014), 265-266 (italics added) [originally published as Sur l’État: Cours au 
Collège de France 1989-1992 (Paris: Seuil, 2012)].
23 Pierre Bourdieu, et al., The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society, 
trans. Priscilla P. Ferguson (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), 508 (italics added) [originally published 
as La Misère du monde, ed. P. Bourdieu (Paris: Seuil, 1993)].
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In this same year, Bourdieu envisages conatus as a tendency located in the 
habitus (as well as in the social field), for both are
the site of a sort of conatus, a tendency to perpetuate themselves 
in their being, to reproduce themselves in that which constitutes 
their existence and their identity [...]. It is not true that everything 
people do is aimed at maximizing their social profit; but one may 
say that they do it to perpetuate or to augment their social be-
ing.24 
In 1994, while asserting that the family and the education system are the 
main forces impelling social change, Bourdieu perceives conatus as the basic 
impulse for all strategies of social reproduction:
Families are corporate bodies animated by a kind of conatus, in 
Spinoza’s sense, that is, a tendency to perpetuate their social be-
ing, with all its powers and privileges, which is at the basis of re-
production strategies [concerning] fertility, marriage, succession 
and, last but not least, education.25
These “strategies of reproduction” appear hazily related to conatus (it is 
said to be their “basis” or principe) in another passus of the same text. There, 
Bourdieu maintains that they
are found, in different forms and with different relative weights, 
in all societies, and whose basis is this sort of conatus, the un-
conscious desire (la pulsion) of the family or the household to 
perpetuate itself by perpetuating its unity against divisive factors 
[...].26
At the closing years of Bourdieu’s lifetime (roughly from 1994 to 2001), he 
reverses his position concerning the consequences of conatus, which now 
appears “fulfilled by” (or emerges “embodied in”) habitus. At that time, in 
short, habitus prevails upon conatus. In a work from 1997, conatus is fuzzily 
24 Pierre Bourdieu, “Concluding Remarks: For a Sociogenetic Understanding of Intellectual 
Works,” in Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, eds. Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe 
Postone, 263-275 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 274 (italics added).
25 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, trans. Randal Johnson (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1998), 19 (italics added) [originally published as Raisons pratiques (Paris: Seuil, 1994)]. 
26 Ibid., 107 (italics added).
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sketched as a historical dynamic wielded by the social world:
The social world has a history, and for this reason it is the site of 
an internal dynamic, independent of the consciousness and will 
of the players, a kind of conatus linked to the existence of mech-
anisms which tend to reproduce the structure of the objective 
probabilities [...].27 
In another place of this same text, conatus appears “fulfilled” by the habitus:
The inherited and therefore immediately attuned habitus, and the 
corporeal constraint exercised through it, are the surest guaran-
tee of direct and total adherence to he often implicit demands of 
these institutions [scil. the corporate bodies]. The reproductive 
strategies which it engenders are one of the mediations through 
which the social order fulfils its tendency to persevere in its being, 
in a word, its conatus.28
Finally, in 2000, while Bourdieu is describing the competition among the 
members of a senior management, the agents involved appear to embody the 
conatus of their social position:
In the struggles in which they engage to press their own ‘views’ 
[...] in so far as each of them in a sense embodies the ‘tendency 
to persevere in being,’ the conatus, of the position he or she oc-
cupies and which his or her entire social being, his or her habitus, 
expresses and realizes, the protagonists commit the capital they 
hold, in its different species and its different states.29
Despite Bourdieu’s wavering, these references to conatus share a highly rel-
evant trait. Bourdieu conceives a “strong” conatus because he assigns it an 
exclusive power of permanence and tends to disregard the Spinozian stress on 
the dependence of conatus vis-à-vis opposing forces.
27 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), 215 (italics added) [originally published as Méditations pascaliennes (Paris: Seuil, 
1997)]. 
28 Ibid., 152 (italics added).
29 Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy, trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge: Polity, 
2005), 217-218 (italics added) [originally published as Les structures sociales de l’économie 
(Paris: Seuil, 2000)].
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IV. Re-instating agency
Appealing to the explanatory resources of the habitus and opposing both social 
physics and canonical structuralism, Bourdieu intended “to re-introduce agents” 
in a context dominated by the active presence of the past sedimented in the 
present. There, “embodied history, converted in nature and hence forgotten as 
such”30 was hegemonic:
I wanted, so to speak, to reintroduce agents that Lévi-Strauss and 
the structuralists […] tended to abolish, making them into simple 
epiphenomena of structure. And I mean agents, not subjects. Action 
is not the mere carrying out (la simple exécution) of a rule. Social 
agents, in archaic societies as well as in ours, are not automata reg-
ulated like clocks, in accordance with laws which they do not un-
derstand. In the most complex games [...] they put into action the 
incorporated principles of a generative habitus.31
Yet “recovering human agency from the grip of structure” (for this is what 
Bourdieu has in mind) presupposes building a case for agency (i.e. understanding 
how agents, presumedly, “are able to do otherwise”32). This is a strenuous com-
mitment because agency cannot but emerge circumscribed, or in other words: 
actors know little from the mechanisms governing social reproduction. They can 
behave only within historically rooted modes of activity, and their actions may 
have unintended consequences. Society encroaches upon (and intervenes within) 
human agency in the form of unconscious motivations for action and through 
specific stockpiles of knowledge. Individuals draw unconsciously upon this hoard-
ed expertise while endeavouring to articulate it. Small wonder that the human 
disciplines highlight the tension between the power of structures and the positing 
of human agency, ancillary to a conception of the human being as both subject 
and object.
30 Pierre Bourdieu, Le Sens pratique (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1980), 91.
31 Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, trans. Matthew 
Adamson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 9. Bourdieu is discussing the founda-
tion of Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales in 1975 and in the same page he precises 
his thought: “In retrospect, the use of the notion of habitus [...] can be understood as a way 
of escaping from the choice between a structuralism without subject and a philosophy of the 
subject. Unfortunately, people apply to my analyses the very alternatives that the notion of 
habitus is meant to exclude, those of consciousness and the unconscious, of explanations by 
determining causes or by final causes.”
32 Every attempt to rescue agency, indeed, must confront the difficulty described by Barry 
Smart as “the dark side” of agency, i.e. the troubles hampering the active, creative, autono-
mous human faculty “to be able to do otherwise.” Cf. Barry Smart, “Foucault, Sociology, and 
the Problem of Human Agency,” Theory and Society 11, no. 2 (1982): 129.
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Bourdieu’s basic tenet is that the most resourceful or spontaneous ac-
tions undertaken by individuals reproduce the structures that brought about 
their habitus. As a result, human action is directed by dispositions beneath 
discursive consciousness. Both practices and perceptions are grounded on 
pre-discursive familiarity with the social worlds we inhabit. Our incorporated 
dispositions are triggered by both the spurs and the hindrances that eventu-
ally emerge.
The theory of habitus has the primordial function of stressing 
that the principle of our actions is more often practical sense 
than rational calculation, [that] the past remains present and ac-
tive in the dispositions it has produced, [and that] social agents 
have, more often than one might expect, dispositions (tastes, for 
example) that are more systematic than one might think.33
On the one hand, habitus is a model for understanding how we function as 
agents,34 making deliberate choices within the constraints of a social space. 
Bourdieu’s approach to action highlights its regularity and coherence, without 
ignoring its negotiated and strategic character. Action is not the automated 
execution of a rule. In this respect, it is a mystery that when people’s actions 
and interactions generate new social institutions and cultural arrangements, 
habituses (and thus structures) consequently move on.
On the other hand, the subjective structures of habitus generate objec-
tive practices (they are structuring structures) but they result from the objec-
tive structures that govern social life (they are structured structures as well). 
The subjective structures that generate objective structures obey to prior ob-
jective structures. In fewer words: the habitus reproduces the structures that 
produced the habitus in the first place.35 In addition, habitus is inadequate 
when confronting phenomena already explained by rules and intentions, 
such as reflection, cultural antagonism, or social change. Many issues that 
Bourdieu discusses are better explained intentionally.
a. An array of difficulties
Small wonder, then, if relevant commentators coincide in their adverse judge-
ment on Bourdieu’s effort to reinstate agency in social thought. In James 
33 Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 64. 
34 Stated in Spinozist vocabulary, the “second nature” in which the habitus consists, insofar as 
it descends from habit, is both naturata (i.e. history become nature) and naturans (able, that is, 
to convert in natural what is historical).
35 The structuralist mind inveighs against agency: the truth of the social world lies on its hidden 
face.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 31/12/2021 12:08:23 |
[ 144 ]
JOSEP MARIA BECH SPINOZA’S CONATUS UNDOES BOURDIEU’S HABITUS
Bohman’s view, for instance, “Bourdieu’s theory provides no basis for prac-
tical agency. He furnishes no reference to intentional level of explanations 
[sic] of what agents see themselves as trying to accomplish.”36 This spurning 
opinion is shared by Nick Crossley: Bourdieu’s habitus ignores the generative 
role of agency. There is something more to agency than the concept of habit 
can fully capture. There is a creative and generative dynamic that makes and 
modifies habits.”37 Moreover, as William Sewell puts it,
In Bourdieu’s habitus, schemata and resources (what he calls ‘men-
tal structures’ and ‘the world of objects’) so powerfully reproduce 
one another that even the most cunning or improvisational ac-
tions undertaken by agents necessarily reproduce the structures.38
Overall, this is a case of incompatible viewpoints. The habitus is ancillary to 
a dualism of objective structures and subordinated individuals, and the at-
tempt “to re-introduce agents” must confront a determinist frame if, as ob-
served above, habitus rests upon conatus in Bourdieu’s “strong” interpretation. 
Contradicting his earlier belittling of a social life led by a “repertory of rules” 
which yet allow agentic resources, some remarks by Bourdieu seem to imply 
that individuals are dominated by objective social structures:
The habitus is the product of the work of inculcation and appro-
priation necessary for those products of collective history: the 
objective structures (i.e. of language, economy, etc.), to succeed 
in reproducing themselves more or less completely, in the form of 
durable dispositions, in [...] individuals lastingly subjected to the 
same conditions of existence.39
Bourdieu highlights the ways in which domination perpetuates itself over time 
and does not discuss how they can be lessened or thwarted. He focuses on 
reproduction and repetition and insists that there is little freedom in social life. 
He does not fail to notice that “improvising” means at bottom “transgressing 
the rules in accordance with the rules for transgressing.”
36 James Bohman, “Practical Reason and Cultural Constraint: Agency in Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice,” in Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Shusterman. 129-152 (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999), 145.
37 Nick Crossley, “The Phenomenological Habitus and Its Construction,” Theory and Society 
30, no. 1 (2001): 95-96.
38 William H. Sewell Jr., Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2005), 138-139.
39 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 85.
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In the scholarly discussion of Bourdieu’s understanding of the habitus, the 
references to determinism abound. Deserve to be highlighted, among them, 
the insight about “the impure determinism of Bourdieu’s thought”40 or the sug-
gestion that “Bourdieu allows a structural determinism in the last instance,”41 
especially if welded to Bourdieu’s “strong” take on conatus. Most of them, 
however, adopt a staple query: How can an agent innovate despite the crushing 
weight of his or her habitus? How can an objective structure, independent of 
both the consciousness and the will of individuals, and bound to constraining 
practices and representations, allow a margin of initiative and creativity?
The presumed rigidity of the “strong” habitus suggests an associated dif-
ficulty, ancillary to the alleged “overwhelming might of the past.” Agency 
can hardly be summoned, indeed, if Bourdieu’s conception of a “strong” co-
natus prevails and the dispositions of the habitus are irrevocable. By invoking a 
“strong” conatus, as we have seen, Bourdieu implied that the habitus expresses 
the impossibility of amending, altering, forgetting, deleting, un-learning. But 
then, how can agency co-exist with a habitus whose chief characteristic is its 
permanence or durableness, since it consists in a system of acquired disposi-
tions that cannot change? Otherwise stated, the habitus is all-powerful, and its 
dispositions are sealed for ever. Therefore, the possibility of backwards altera-
tion is excluded, and the dominance of the past appears inescapable.
b. Subjective expectations vs. objective possibilities
The unswerving character assigned to the habitus explains the survivance, amid 
altered settings, of precedent schemas for action. This is due to the decalage 
caused by the inertial properties of the habitus (in short, its “strong” conatus), 
which if not counterbalanced by external forces destroy any possible fit be-
tween mental and social structures. Bourdieu names “hysteresis” these inertial 
traits: “there is an inertia (or hysteresis) of habitus which have a spontaneous 
tendency to perpetuate structures corresponding to the conditions that pro-
duced them.”42 This permanence accounts for the errors of perspective that 
lead social agents to “wrong” decisions and appraisals. “The hysteresis of the 
habitus [...] is doubtless one of the foundations of the structural lag between 
opportunities and the dispositions to grasp them, which is the cause of missed 
opportunities.”43
40 Cf. Miriam Aiello, “Habitus. Per una stratigrafia filosòfica,” Consecutio Rerum 1, no. 1 
(2016): 202.
41 Cf. Richard Jenkins, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Reproduction of Determinism,” Sociology 16, 
no. 2 (1982): 270-281.
42 Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 160.
43 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 83.
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A hardened array of dispositions, therefore, must cope with a potential 
infinity of unforeseen situations. The inevitable transformation of the objective 
conditions enforces a gap between the habitus (a huge reservoir of history) and 
the present social experiences of his or her carrier. According to Bourdieu,
As a result of the hysteresis effect, necessarily implicated in the 
logic of the constitution of habitus, practices are always liable to 
incur negative sanctions when the environment with which they 
are actually confronted is too distant from that in which they are 
objectively fitted.44
Its determinist aura notwithstanding, and despite the negative connotations 
(deficiency, delay) suggested by the etymology of the term, the hysteresis has 
eye-opening consequences. On the one hand, it provides opportunities for the 
socially dominating strata to dominate further, whereas the dominated are 
bound to continue misrecognizing their (doubtless meagre) assets in the so-
cial game. On the other hand, as the precedent quote suggests, the inertia of 
the habitus (particularly highlighted in The Logic of Practice) seems to open a 
weird window of opportunity for the dominated. After all, it is conceivable that 
they reshape their practices upon noticing that their dispositions are manifestly 
ill-adjusted:
The presence of the past in the kind of false anticipation of the fu-
ture performed by the habitus is, paradoxically, most clearly seen 
when the sense of a probable future is belied.45
c. Individual strategies are impossible
Considering Bourdieu’s “strong” view of conatus, the habitus presupposes a 
reawakening of the past that disables the individual’s initiative. It is startling, 
therefore, that according to Bourdieu the habitus can allow strategies46 (that 
is, ensembles of coordinated moves, oriented to an end) containing room for 
manoeuvre and presupposing improvisation. In his view, these practical skills 
for decision-taking imply a pre-reflexive, unconscious familiarity with the so-
44 Ibid., 78.
45 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1990), 62.
46 Perhaps it is worthwhile to recall that in current parlance “strategy” is understood as an 
ensemble of coordinated moves, oriented to an end and presupposing intention. A conscious 
agent calculates the best relationship between acquired advantages and possible gains. The ac-
tive response by the agent is bound to match structural constraints on the agent. Understanding 
the situation seems imperative.
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cial world, acquired through a long involvement. Such practices are finalized 
behaviours:
the good player [...] does at every moment what the game re-
quires. This presupposes a permanent capacity for invention, in-
dispensable if one is to be able to adapt to indefinitely varied 
and never completely identical situations.47
These strategies are not intentional modalities of action, and the agents are 
seldom conscious of them. While closely related to extant opportunities 
and exclusions, they cannot be the result of consciously determined aims.48 
They result from the interaction between the dispositions of the habitus and 
the constraints imposed, or the possibilities offered, by the social world. 
According to Bourdieu, besides, any strategy is the opus operatum in regard 
of habitus as opus operandi. He thus advocates, 
working back from the opus operatum, from practices that re-
veal themselves to intuition like a data rhapsody, to the modus 
operandi, to the generating and unifying habitus that produces 
objectively systematic strategies.49
This means that the habitus, understood as “a system of dispositions acquired 
by implicit or explicit learning, which functions as a system of generative 
schemes [...] generates strategies” adequate to both familiar and unforeseen 
situations. In both cases, these strategies “can be objectively consistent with 
the objective interests of their authors without having ben expressly designed 
to that end.”50
The link of Bourdieu’s “strategy” to a weak conatus, ceaselessly subject-
ed to the constraints of opposite powers, has been remarked by prominent 
commentators:
The active resistance offered by conatus to a total annihilation 
by stronger exterior forces appears as an existential affirmation 
47 Bourdieu, In Other Words, 63.
48 Some strategies are both reinforced and concealed by a “second-order” strategy. Social 
games (for instance the gift) often imply that the players misrecognize the objective truth of 
the game.
49 Bourdieu, State Nobility, 274.
50 Pierre Bourdieu, Sociology in Question, trans. Richard Nice (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
and New Delhi: Sage, 1993), 76 [originally published as Questions de sociologie (Paris: Editions 
de Minuit, 1980)]. 
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that amount to a strategy. Resistance and strategy are entailed 
by the essence of any real entity. The idea of strategy perma-
nently decides the stakes of life and death for any conatus.51
Overall, then, Bourdieu’s subject cannot freely choose his or her strategy, 
for it consists in the crossing of multiple, heterogeneous causal series, “the 
individual trace of a whole collective history.”52 A kind of collective decision 
(amounting to a “weak” conatus) prevails upon rational individual choice:
You can see that the subject is not the instantaneous ego of 
a sort of singular cogito, but the individual trace of an entire 
collective history [...]. In fact, nobody knows any longer who the 
subject of the final decision is.53
Otherwise stated, intentionality plays only a subordinated role in Bourdieu’s 
notion of strategy. The dispositions of the habitus are predominantly uncon-
scious, for the average social practice does not consist in reflexive, intention-
al, and creative action. The social struggle can only take place by concealing 
the strategies involved.
V. A Trojan Horse nested inside another Trojan Horse
It has been often pointed out that while Bourdieu appears to defend volun-
tarism (“I wanted to reintroduce the agents that the structuralists tended 
to abolish”) by endorsing controlled improvisation (i.e. improvisation within 
limits), in fact determinism prevails in his thought, as shown by his varying 
involvement with a “strong” conatus. Objective structures mould the sub-
jective structures and these in turn shape once again the objective structures, 
which leaves scarce leeway to spontaneity. Jeffrey Alexander displayed fig-
uratively this Bourdieuan liability when he dubbed the concept of habitus “a 
Trojan Horse for determinism.”54 According to Alexander, Bourdieu fostered 
a determinist upheaval from within the beleaguered Troy of the agency-home-
sick using (albeit unwittingly) deceptive means.55 Extending this metaphor, 
51 Laurent Bove, La stratégie du conatus. Affirmation et résistance chez Spinoza (Paris: Vrin, 
1996), 14.
52 Bourdieu, In Other Words, 91.
53 Ibid., 91-92.
54 Jeffrey Alexander, Fin de Siècle Social Theory: Relativism, Reduction, and the Problem of 
Reason (London: Verso, 1995), 137.
55 The agency-homesick have backed this subversion in a self-defeating way. After all, the 
Trojan Horse was the stratagem that caused the unsuspecting Trojans to request their foe (the 
concealed Greeks) into their strongly defended citadel.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 31/12/2021 12:08:23 |
[ 149 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 6, ISSUE 2 • 2021
the conatus may be viewed as another, in this case pivotal Trojan Horse nest-
ed Matryoshka-like inside the habitus (Alexander’s staple Trojan Horse). It 
must be kept in mind, however, that this furtive conatus achieves opposite 
outcomes (its impact may be either subversive or reinforcing) depending on 
whether it is read as “weak” or “strong.”
In the first case, Bourdieu’s recurrent commitment to a “weak” conatus 
may appear as an unruly Trojan Horse for universal fickleness and unpredicta-
bility nested inside the alleged Trojan Horse for determinism. This Bourdieuan 
view, indeed, further jeopardizes the already questioned capacity of the habi-
tus to explain permanence in the social world. Yet such permanence (unrelat-
ed to willed and intentional endurance) seems assured if we accept Bourdieu’s 
“strong” reading of the conatus, which in this case can be viewed as the loy-
ally nested Trojan Horse that reinforces the determinist sway of the habitus.
Still, deciding to what extent events are somehow permanent (i.e. wheth-
er permanence amounts to a socio-historical “rocky bottom”) is of course a 
thorny issue. Concisely stated: do the effects of everything that has happened 
endure forever, or they undergo instead a progressive erosion and ultimately 
fade out? If perpetuation prevails, the “strong” version of conatus emerges 
as an antidote against disappearance and loss. On a wider scope, then, a con-
cept of habitus supported by Bourdieu’s intermittent preference for a tough 
reading of the conatus endorses the age-old assumption that can be called 
“the mythology of permanence.”
This mythology amounts to a hypostasis of tradition and historical con-
tinuity. Its central tenet is a ceaseless staying power held by all outcomes 
along time. It is assumed, indeed, that they: a) remain immune to present 
choices; b) are supported by both manifest carriers and self-concealed under-
currents; and c) do not become exposed to disappearances, recoveries, dis-
tortions, or transformations. In short, they would fall prey to the Darwinian 
disparagement of calcified inheritances that result in unimaginable accumu-
lations. Yet this is precisely what a habitus backed by a “strong” conatus is 
bound to bring about, because in that case all human beings would become 
“walking museums of ancestral decrepitude, pock-marked from ancestral 
plagues, limping relicts of ancestral misfortune.”56
In this regard, the gist of the preceding research involves deciding upon 
several alternatives. They set up the divide between a “strong” and a “weak” 
conatus, which is crucial, as already shown, for Bourdieu’s incompatible pro-
jects. Does a specific conatus dissipate itself spontaneously the further it 
gets from its origin? Or does it maintain itself over time, in some way kept 
alive by other people’s conatus? Or else does it remain unchanged unless 
56 Richard Dawkins, A Devil’s Chaplain: Reflections on Hope, Lies, Science, and Love (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2003), 90.
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actively interfered with? Spinoza’s position in that respect, as we have seen, 
contrasts with Bourdieu’s wavering. Outcomes fade out, get eroded, under-
go corrosion, are resisted. Some of them, fortuitously, survive. In other cas-
es, further phases of a given process negate the precedent ones. Unintended 
consequences, on occasion, may deflect antecedent aims. Then permanence 
re-emerges (for it may be intermittent) with altered features.
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